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Abstract
Our study reexamines standard econometric approaches for the detection of information
asymmetries on insurance markets. We claim that evidence based on a standard framework
with 2 equations, which uses potential sources of information asymmetries, should stress the
importance of heterogeneity in the parameters. We argue that conclusions derived from this
methodology can be misleading if the estimated coefficients in such an ‘unused characteristics’
framework are driven by different parts of the population.
We show formally that an individual’s expected risk from the perspective of insurance,
conditioned on certain characteristics (which are not used for calculating the risk premium),
can equal the population’s expectation in risk – although such characteristics are both related
to risk and insurance probability, which is usually interpreted as an indicator of information
asymmetries.
We provide empirical evidence on the existence of information asymmetries in the mar-
ket for supplementary private health insurance in the UK. Overall, we found evidence for
advantageous selection into the private risk pool; ie people with lower health risk tend
to insure more. The main drivers of this phenomenon seem to be characteristics such
as income and wealth. Nevertheless, we also found parameter heterogeneity to be relevant,
leading to possible misinterpretation if the standard ‘unused characteristics’ approach is applied.
Keywords: Information Asymmetries; Insurance markets; Applied Econometrics
JEL classification: I11; I13; C18
1 Introduction
More than 15 per cent of UK citizens have either full private health cover, or partial private
health cover, in addition to their use of the National Health Service (NHS)1. 41 per cent of the
adult population have life insurance; by contrast, as many as 68 per cent play the national lottery
or gamble2. There are several possible explanations for differences in peoples’ private insurance
requirements and they can be explained by the supply and demand side of the insurance market.
One commonly given explanation is that individual preferences influence the probability that
a person buys insurance. Another explanation regards the heterogeneity in risk which the
insurance company does not take into account when calculating the risk premium, but is taken
into account by customers making decisions to buy insurance. However, the converse may also
be true: some risk-related characteristics of customers are used by insurance companies to lower
their exposure to high risk policyholders.The evaluation of information asymmetries (IA) is still
a big issue in economic research. However, certainly within the UK, very little research has been
done in this area up to now.
The level of health experienced by individuals clearly directly affects their happiness, con-
tribution to the economy and their ability to participate within society at large. There will
always be a disparity in health status between members of a population. Furthermore, pro-
viding healthcare for a population is becoming increasingly expensive; in part due to technical
advances in treatments and also due to demographic change (ie an ageing population). It is
therefore becoming even more important to have a health insurance market which allocates its
resources as efficiently as possible.
Since Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) wrote their seminal works on market
efficiency in insurance markets, there has been a preponderance of theoretical and empirical
research in this field. A key area of research remains, and that is how information asymmetries
and their consequences can be accurately and adequately measured. This area is so important
as it directly affects the funding of a country’s health and welfare system.
The aim of this paper is twofold: Firstly, after discussing some commonly used tests for
the detection of information asymmetries, we show formally that an approach which allows the
detection of information asymmetries due to specific characteristics can lead to the wrong con-
clusions being made. This is the case if estimated coefficients for a potential source of IA in a
framework with two equations are driven by different parts of the population. Secondly, account-
ing for this issue, we provide empirical evidence on the existence of information asymmetries on
the market for private health insurance for the English age 50+ population.
In this paper, we start with an introduction of the institutional background to the current
health care provision in the UK. We then provide a literature overview with an emphasis on
several commonly used tests to identify information asymmetries. Following this, we show that
under specific circumstances a test based on two equations is misleading. In the empirical
section of this paper we compare evidence based on such a test, with specifications allowing for
parameter heterogeneity. Our empirical analysis is based on the English Longitudinal Survey of
Ageing (ELSA) survey; an individual level dataset representative of the UK’s population over
age 50. After discussing our findings, we draw conclusions and make suggestions for future
economic research in this field.
1http://www.ess-europe.de/en/uk health insurance.htm
2http://www.principlefirst.co.uk/insurance-news/more-play-lotto-than-buy-life-insurance-cover/
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2 Theoretical considerations
2.1 Institutional Background
The population of the United Kingdom is entitled to free healthcare, and this is provided by
the National Health Service (NHS) through primary care (general practice) and secondary care
(hospital based care given through both NHS and Foundation trusts).3 The main principle of
the NHS is to make health services available to every single UK citizen who is in need. However,
in practice, there are a number of treatments which are not available within the system. Most
of the latter are excluded because they are viewed as being non-essential, but some are excluded
for financial reasons.4 In addition to the public provision of healthcare via the NHS, individuals
can choose to top up their provision through the purchase of private health insurance. This
might be done on an individual basis or as part of the benefits package offered by the employer.
The insurance usually provides cover for enhanced services such as faster access and a wider
consumer choice, compared to what is offered by the NHS. Insurers can freely determine their
services, but most packages cover surgery as an inpatient or day case, hospital accommodation,
nursing care and inpatient tests. Since there is no regulation on products or pricing (Boyle,
2011), we can assume that the market for private supplementary health insurance in the UK is
competitive. Although a competitive market should result in an actuarially fair risk premium
due to the possibility of consumers switching between different health care plans, we cannot
infer any conclusions about the efficiency in this market, i.e selection effects due to information
asymmetries that are not accounted for in the risk premium. There is a broad range of literature
on theoretical aspects of IA and how to measure them.
2.2 The Detection of Information Asymmetries
The empirical evidence on the existence of IA is mixed. In a recent article, Cohen and Siegelman
(2010) provide a metastudy on testing for adverse selection on a wide range of insurance markets.
They focus on the positive correlation approach and find that a risk-insurance-correlation exists
in some studies but not in others. For example, the evidence in the market for health insurance
seems to be strongly heterogeneous. Looking at studies which focus on the US market, they find
evidence for both the existence of information asymmetries and market efficiency. Furthermore,
they claim that one has to distinguish between different kinds of IA. They conclude that it might
be of interest to evaluate the circumstances under which adverse selection seems to or does not
seem to arise. This point of view is especially relevant from a policy perspective, given that if
any institutional changes were made, we would like to predict efficiency changes which occur
from the initial market conditions. In their work, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) emphasize mainly
on an approach for the detection of IA, developed by Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997). This test is
still widely used today, despite ongoing developments in the area. The main thrust of the test
is to jointly estimate two different equations. The first one captures the probability of buying
an insurance contract, given the information about an individual which an insurance company
will use for calculating the risk premium. The second equation measures the correlation of these
variables with the probability of the insurer making a loss on the contract. The error term of
both equations will cover all the information in respect of both events which are not used for
pricing purposes. If risk and insurance coverage are correlated, this is usually interpreted as
indicating that a self selection process is occurring. Hence it is useful to estimate the correlation
3http://www.nhshistory.com/
4http://www.londonhealth.co.uk/nhs/index.html
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between both the equations’ error terms. This approach is often called the ‘positive correlation
test’.
Formally this approach can be described by the following equations, where I is an indicator
for insurance status and R and indicator for being at risk:
I = Xδ + ǫ (1)
and
R = Xβ + η (2)
Another approach which is instead based on a single equation estimate is suggested by Dionne
et al. (2001) which evaluates IA in the automobile insurance market. Their approach is based
on the relation
I = Xδ1 +Aδ2 + Aˆδ3 + ǫ (3)
Here, insurance probability is the dependent variable and items within the consumer information
held by the insurance company are the explanatory variables. As further control variables the
authors use the number of accidents (A) as well as the expected number of accidents (Aˆ). These
are calculated based on consumer demographics and will capture nonlinearities in the initial
exogenous control variables which the insurance company uses for pricing.
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), however, argue that such a positive correlation of the
error terms in the ‘Chiappori approach’ is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
the existence of information asymmetries. They suggest that misleading results of such a test
might arise if more than one characteristic has an impact on both dependent variables, and
that both effects cancel out on average. For example, in additional to an individual’s risk class,
risk preference heterogeneity of the consumers might offset the correlation of the two equations’
error terms. The authors state that if an econometrician can observe such relevant information,
and this information is not used for pricing by the insurer, then an inclusion of this variable
as an additional explanatory variable into equations (1) and (2) above will make it possible to
detect this kind of self selection separately – despite the second relevant variable having the
‘offsetting’ effect. This approach, which we call the ‘unused characteristics approach’, is based
on the equations:
I = Xδ1 + Zδ2 + ǫ (4)
and
R = Xβ1 + Zβ2 + η. (5)
Z represents a matrix containing additional information about the insured but which is not
used for pricing. The condition for recognising information asymmetries would be that any new
variable being included in the model has an impact both on insurance probability and of ‘being
at risk’. In their study, Finkelstein and McGarry are able to use information that is assumed to
be unknown to the insurer in the market for long term care (LTC) in the US. In their econometric
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model, they chose the self stated probability of utilising nurse help to be a possible source for
adverse selection. For advantageous selection they used investment in preventative health care
and the usage of seatbelts, both of which can be interpreted as private information not used for
pricing purposes by an insurance company. In addition, they compare their findings with those
of two other approaches to detect information asymmetries – whose results are quite similar. The
first approach is the classical test of correlating the error terms of the two equations; the second
is a one-equation model where risk class is the dependent variable and insurance status is an
independent variable. It is a slightly modified version of the positive correlation test suggested
by Dionne et al. (2001).
The ‘unsused characteristics’ approach just described can be also useful if we are interested
in market efficiency with regard to pricing, without using observables. Compared to the case
mentioned above, Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) focus on a scenario when insurance compa-
nies observe, or could observe, relevant characteristics of their customers, but do not use this
information when calculating the risk premium. When analysing the UK annuity market, they
show that annuity purchases and the annuitant’s mortality are regionally correlated. Making
the assumption that regional information is not used for calculating the risk premium, this
is interpreted as an indicator of adverse selection. Finkelstein and Poterba’s results raise the
question as to why insurance companies do not use such relevant information.
Cutler et al. (2008) look for information asymmetries within several insurance markets in the
US, based on data from the Health and Retirement Study. They also use a 2-equation model.
One equation has insurance status and the other has risk occurrence as dependent variables.
While conditioning on variables which are used for insurance pricing, they also include some
behavioural variables which are used to measure heterogeneity in risk preference (seatbelt usage,
preventive activities) and individual risk behaviour (eg smoking, drinking). Their findings show
that individuals with characteristics that imply low risk have a higher probabilty of buying an
insurance product. The expected claims of these individuals suggest advantageous selection
in the market for life and LTC insurance, but adverse selection for annuities. For Medigap
and acute health insurance no systematic relationship between risk-characteristics and expected
claims was found.
Dardanoni and Li Donni (2008) use the same type of test but implement it in a different
way. They use a finite mixture model to identify types which are unobservable due to heteroge-
neous risk behaviours and risk classes, and they impose the assumption that these unobserved
factors are constant. Their findings suggest both asymmetric information and multidimensional
unobserved heterogeneity in the LTC market in the US.
There are some studies on IA in insurance markets using ‘self-assessed health’ for capturing
individual risk, as this study does. For example, Doiron et al. (2008) analysed the relationship
between health status and private health insurance in Australia. They used self assessed health
as their health risk indicator. One feature of their study, and a difference from the institutional
background in our study, is that insurance companies were not allowed to calculate premiums
based on individual characteristics, and furthermore all applicants had to be accepted for cover.
They therefore argue that the correlation between explanatory variables is due to consumer
preferences rather than insurance actions. Given this assumption, they interpret the correlation
of objective health measures and health risk, and the correlation between health risk and insur-
ance coverage, as pure indicators of adverse selection. Furthermore, they find risky behaviour
to be negatively correlated with risk and insurance probability, suggesting that heterogeneous
risk preferences are a source of advantageous selection.
Bolin et al. (2010) have also used self assessed health as an indicator of being at risk. They
evaluate asymmetric information and the demand for voluntary health insurance in Europe
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using the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) dataset. The dataset
is comparable to the one we use in our study, since it is representative of the age 50+ population.
Their results support those of previous studies, which suggest a negative correlation between
health-risk and voluntary health insurance. The authors focus on the correlation between self-
assessed health (as a measure for health risk) and the probability of taking out insurance.
Furthermore, they distinguish between heterogeneous risk preferences and screening. They
conclude that there seem to be no heterogeneous risk preferences behind the negative correlation
between health status and the probability of taking out insurance. Interestingly, they also find
a negative correlation between risk and insurance but find no evidence that this is an indicator
for heterogeneous risk preferences.
There is little evidence on this issue regarding the market for supplementary private health
insurance in the UK. Propper et al. (2001) analyse the dynamics in the demand for private
medical insurance (PMI) between 1978 and 1996, using the Family Expenditure Survey. Ac-
counting for consumer characteristics and health service quality measures, they find that the
availability of private healthcare facilities and cohort effects, which might indicate changes in
tastes/attitude, to be relevant determinants of the purchase of PMI.
Wallis (2003) also looks for the determinants of demand for PMI in the UK, based on British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data. He evaluates the switching behaviour of individuals
and focuses both on characteristics influencing the probability of purchasing insurance and
the individual cost of PMI (ie the risk premium). He differentiates between the demand side
characteristics of consumers and the supply side aspects that can influence insurance status, eg
quality of service.
Another study, which uses the BHPS data, was done by Olivella and Vera-Hernandez (2006).
They focus on adverse selection in the market for PMI, using hospitalisation as a measure for
being at risk. Assuming that the health status of individuals is independent of receiving PMI as
a fringe employment benefit, their results suggest the existence of adverse selection in the PMI
market in England.
Until now, no empirical evidence on specific sources of information asymmetries in the UK
private health insurance market has been found. One of the aims of this study is to analyse
this further. In addition, it is of great interest to determine whether adverse selection is still an
issue in the UK if another method of measuring information asymmetries is used.
2.3 Using Unused Variables
The starting point of our discussion is the positive correlation test of Chiappori and Salanie´
(1997), who suggest that if the hypothesis of a correlation between the 2 equations’ error terms
can be rejected, both equations are determined independently – ie insurance coverage and risk
are uncorrelated. It is worth mentioning that this test allows us to compare each individual i in
the sample with itself (Cov(ηi, ǫi) = E(ηi − η¯)(ǫi − ǫ¯)) since the estimated error terms are given
at the individual level.
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) argue that the standard positive correlation test is going to
fail if we find more than one individual characteristic that is not used for pricing purposes, but
which affect insurance status and risk of loss to the insurance company. Both characteristics
can lead to an offsetting of the correlation between the equations’ error terms.
The advantage of such an ‘unused characteristics’ approach is that it enables one to identify
concrete characteristics which can, from a theoretical perspective, be assumed to be a source of
IA, even if the positive correlation test does not lead to such a revelation. The interpretation
of the coefficients in these models is perfectly reasonable if we have an underlying theory as to
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why these characteristics should be correlated with both insurance and health status.
However, a disadvantage of this approach compared to the standard positive correlation test
is that we measure correlations of included variables with both risk situation and insurance
status, without relating both equations to one another from a statistical perspective (as the
positive correlation test does).
Here, the conclusion about selection effects is derived based on the significance of the added
variables in both equations, which is reasonable in some cases. This approach might, however,
be problematic if we find an additional variable to be relevant in our framework and we, a
priori, do not have a good theory about the mechanism which relates this variable to risk and
insurance status. This is the case since a variable might, on average, control for relevant factors
which explain, for example, insurance probability and risk situation on the one hand. But, on
the other hand, it is possible that these estimated coefficients are driven by different parts of
the sample. We suggest that if individuals with a common characteristic are heterogeneous in
outcomes of this characteristic (ie marginal changes in risk and insurance probability due to
an unused variable are negatively related) the ‘unused characteristics’ approach can lead to the
wrong conclusions being made.
To describe this issue formally, we simplify equations 4 and 5 without loss of generality in
a way that we exclude all ‘observable’ information from both equations, allowing just for one
‘unused’ variable z and rewrite them as follows:
E(R|z) = E(βz + η)
and
E(I|z) = E(δz + ǫ)
where estimates βˆ > 0 and δˆ > 0 would usually be interpreted as an indicator of adverse
selection. Now let’s assume that every parameter is defined for every single individual i with
the population means E(βi) = µβ > 0 and E(δi) = µδ > 0. Furthermore let’s assume for
simplification that Cov(zi, βi) = 0, Cov(zi, δi) = 0 and Cov(ηi, ǫi) = 0.
Based on this model we now evaluate the risk position of the subpopulation being insured
(δizi + ǫi > 0):
E(Ri|Ii > 0) = E(βizi|δizi > −ǫi)
Given the population means µβ and E(zi) = µz, this equation can be rewritten as
E(βizi|δizi > −ǫi) =µβµz (6)
+ µβ × E(zi − µz|δizi > −ǫi)
+ µz × E(βi − µβ |δizi > −ǫi)
+ E((βi − µβ)(zi − µz)|δizi > −ǫi).
We want to show under which circumstances E(Ri) = E(Ri|Ii > 0), since in that case the ‘unused
characteristics’ approach would have falsely detected adverse selection. The first and second term
in decomposition (6) is positive due to our assumptions. Hence, E(βizi|δizi > −ǫi) = E(R) can
be true if E(βi−µβ |δizi > −ǫi) < 0 or E((βi−µβ)(zi−µz)|δizi > −ǫi) < 0. Therefore, we would
need Cov(βi, δi) < 0, and thus E(βi|δizi > −ǫi) < µβ to allow for an offsetting of the other terms
in the decomposition.
This means that in expectation, for an individual whose βi is smaller than the population
mean µβ , the individual coefficient δi will be higher than the estimated population mean µδ,
and vice versa.
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Obviously our framework requires Cov(βi, δi) > 0 in the case of µβ < 0 and µδ > 0, ie wrongly
detected advantageous selection with the ‘unused characteristics’ approach. If the correlation of
βi and δi is strong enough, the suggested direction of selection may even change to opposite of
what it should be.
To solve this problem, one could implement a comparison of insurance and risk status at the
individual level, as done by Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997), by means of calculating the correlation
of the error terms. As Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) argue, this approach is not helpful in all
contexts, since some correlations might cancel out.
The method suggested by Dionne et al. (2001) is also not of help if we want to know if
one specific variable generates IA. This is because we would only find this variable if it were
significantly correlated with both insurance status and health risk. Hence we need to find another
way to deal with this issue. A commonly used way to account for the possibility of heterogeneous
parameters is to split the sample and calculate the probabilities of being privately insured,
separately for groups with different health risk. Thus, the model we implement is based on the
equation
E(I|R = r) = E(Xδ1 + Zδ2 + ǫ|R = r) (7)
where r is an indicator variable for being in a specific risk class.
Hence, the first step is to measure the impact of potential sources of IA on the probability
of risk and taking out insurance. The second step is to run separate estimations for people with
contrasting health-risk states and then compare how an added variable, that is assumed not
to be used for calculating risk premiums, affects the insurance probability in both groups. If
the coefficient is similar for the two different groups, then subpopulations with heterogeneous
coefficients should not lead to misleading results within the ‘unused characteristics’framework.
As far as we know, there is scant literature on the detection of information asymmetries with
a focus on differing subpopulations. Having said that, we should mention a study by Cohen
(2005) who finds heterogeneous results for several subsets in the population of policyholders in
the car insurance market. However, the background to Cohen’s work is not the same since she
uses different information about the customers’ contract choices to inform the analysis whereas
we focus on whether the detection of selection effects which are given by commonly used tests
can be misleading as a result of having diverging subpopulations. This seems to be especially
important if we, a priori, do not have an assumption about the correlation between a variable
and health status or insurance status from a theoretical point of view.
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Data and Econometric Model
Our empirical illustration of this idea is based on ELSA, which is a representative individual
level dataset for England’s age 50+ population. No study has used this data for detecting
information asymmetries before, and we know from previous research that tax subsidies which
existed up until the end of the 1990s induced economic incentives for older people to buy private
medical insurance in England (King and Mossialos, 2005). Hence, it is of interest to focus on
this subpopulation to reveal whether the decision to buy supplementary health insurance was
accompanied by a self-selection of good or bad risks into the insurance market via information
asymmetries. The ELSA dataset contains a broad range of information on an individual’s health
and financial circumstances, together with the demographics, which makes it an ideal source to
model both economic decisions and health related characteristics.
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For our analysis we use the cross sectional dimension of Wave 2 as it gives us the richest
source of available and relevant information. Since our model is based on a static model of self
selection, we do not need to allow for the time dimension of the dataset.
As a main dependent variable, we use self assessed health5 as a measure for being at risk.
Although this information can be subjective, we assume it to be a reasonable indicator since it
is not just capturing observable information (which we control for in our analysis) but also all
information that can affect future demand for health care which cannot be accounted for from
using observable and objective health data. Based on their findings, Idler and Benyamini (1997)
argue that a global health rating “. . . represents an irreplaceable dimension of health status
and in fact that an individual’s health cannot be assessed without it.” Hence, we conclude that
self assessed health is a suitable measure for our purposes.
ELSA provides the commonly used 5-point scale SAH measure which covers health as a
factor, varying between ‘Excellent’ and ‘Very Bad’. We collapse this information into a binary
variable which we call ‘Good’, which represents people answering ‘Excellent’ and ‘Very Good’.
All other responses are scored zero. This way we are able to achieve an average health status in
our sample that is near the median. Given that the information used is subjective, we postulate
that collapsing the health variable as described will provide much more robust findings about
the population’s health than if we had used the ordinal scaled information divided into 5 health
categories. The second main dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if someone
has private health insurance and 0 otherwise.
As previously mentioned, it is important for our research question to assume that the econo-
metric model contains all the relevant information used by an insurance company in order to
calculate the risk premium. Since the people in our sample have private health care insurance
with different suppliers, we cannot provide a general framework for calculating the premiums.
We therefore have to make assumptions which are as realistic as possible. We know that insurers
price risk mainly on age, but other factors such as sex, smoking status and occupational status
can be also taken into account. Treatment for specific illnesses (eg chronic conditions) can be
excluded from a private health insurance policy. However, we know that insurers require the
applicants to provide detailed information on their past and present health status (Boyle, 2011)
and it is therefore reasonable to assume that this information is used by insurance companies for
pricing purposes. Hence, in our model, we assume that the following variables are used by insur-
ance companies: Age, sex, smoking, employment status, education (where ‘no qualification’ is
the reference group), race, family status (indicator for being married or cohabiting), whether the
person has children and whether the person has children living at home. Since we have detailed
information on each individual’s health, we can also include variables capturing hypertension,
previously diagnosed angina, diabetes, stroke and cancer. Heart problems due to myocardial
infarction, congestive heart failure, heart murmur and arrhythmia, are controlled for as well. In
addition, we collapse hedibonic lung disease and asthma into one illness category, and arthritis
and osteoporosis into another. Parkinson’s disease, psychiatric disorder, Alzheimer’s disease and
dementia are also taken into account together. The final health category concerns eye problems
such as glaucoma, diabetic eye disease, macular degeneration and cataract. All these health
variables are self stated, so it might be possible that we have a bias due to measurement error.
We also require additional control variables that affect both health status and the probability
of purchasing insurance but which we assume are not used by an insurance company for pricing
purposes. We include the following as such variables: weekly income and financial wealth
(equivalised on the basis of the number of people in the household who benefit from the income),
5Variable definitions and descriptive statistics in Table 1 and Table 2
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and lifestyle variables which are usually used to control for heterogeneous health risk such as
drinking behaviour, and being overweight.
Another characteristic which could capture differences in risk is the region where the re-
spondent lives. Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) found this information relevant in the insurance
market for annuities. In our context, regional information could be important too, since it is
widely known that the health status of people strongly varies by locality. For example, mortality
rates from cardiovascular disease are much higher in the northern parts than the southern parts
of England (Mu¨ller-Nordhorn et al., 2008). If such health differences also correlate with insur-
ance purchase probability, then the existence of selection effects might be indicated. To control
for this, we group regions into a northern part (North, North West, Yorkshire, Humberside and
Durham), a midland part (East Midlands, West Midlands and East Anglia) and the South West
(with the South East used as the reference category). Since we know that health is on average
better in urban than in rural areas (Dye, 2008) we also use a dummy variable to capture whether
a respondent is living in a highly dense region (5th quintile).
As a benchmark we apply the classical correlation test of Chiappori and Salanie´ and estimate
a bivariate probit model, including as explanatory variables all the information known to the
insurer. We then calculate the correlation of residuals. The dependent variables in this model
are insurance status and being in good health (ie low risk). Furthermore, we apply univariate
probit specifications within the ‘unused characteristics’ framework to determine whether we
can identify some specific variables which are not used for pricing, but which do affect both
health risk and insurance probability. Such a finding is usually interpreted as indicating a
selection mechanism due to IA, which would not necessarily be revealed with the methodology
of Chiappori and Salanie´. We use sample weights for the estimations and cluster the standard
errors at household level. All estimation outputs show marginal effects.
To see whether conclusions based on the ’unused characteristics’ approach are misleading
due to having a heterogeneous population, we estimate equation (6) for the subpopulations for
which our health indicator variable r equals 1 and 0 separately, and compare the results. This
is a simplification of the framework provided in the last section, since our conditioning variable
is not defined continuously any more. Furthermore, we test for the relevance of parameter
heterogeneity via estimating a pooled, fully interacted specification, ie we calculate marginal
effects for a specification where the insurance status is explained by all explanatory variables
together with their interaction with good health status. In this framework, both high and low risk
individuals are assumed to have the same constant, which is in line with the idea of the unused
charactersitics approach. This procedure allows us to directly test the statistical significance of
heterogeneous parameters between the two risk groups. Due to the nonlinear relationship in our
setup the marginal effects of the interaction terms were calculated manually6. In addition, we
check whether the findings of this approach are robust, by comparing it with the results of a
linear probability model (LPM).
3.2 Results and Discussion
The application of the approach of Chiappori and Salanie´, explaining insurance status and
‘low risk’, strongly suggests the existence of advantageous selection (ie that healthier people
are more likely to take out private health insurance). Assuming no offsetting effects due to
multiple information, a correlation coefficient of 0.11 (p-value: 0.00) suggests that there is a
relevant mechanism that relates the insurance decision and an individual’s health positively,
conditioned on the observables used by the insurer. Findings, based on a specification where the
6For an insightful discussion see Ai and Norton (2003).
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health measure is representing one SAH-category more, yield quite similar results (correlation
coefficient 0.10; p-value: 0.01). A specification which excludes all personal health information
from the model reveals a correlation coefficient of 0.12 with p-value: 0.00. Knowing that this
finding is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for IA, we now focus on the results using
the ‘unused characteristics’ approach.
The marginal effects of a probit regression based on equation (4)7 show that income and
wealth, conditioned on all other information used in our model, both have a significant positive
impact on being privately insured. Our regional variables suggest that living in the regions
away from the South East of England, is negatively related to the probability of being privately
insured. This effect is strongest for the North of England. In other words, it seems to be the
case that the further an individual lives from the South East of England, the less likely they are
to have purchased private health insurance.
The results for the correlation of our unused characteristics with being at low risk, based
on Equation (5), show that income and wealth are positively related to low risk, which seems
to be intuitively reasonable (ie the higher the income, the more likely the individual is to be
healthy). Drinking is positively related to the dependent variable, which is a little puzzling since
one might expect that heavier drinking is more likely to be associated with poor health. One
possible explanation is that it is capturing factors such as social relationships. Being overweight
is negatively correlated with low risk. All regional variables are negatively correlated with being
at low risk, although the coefficients are not statistically significant different from 0. Nevertheless
the sign of the coefficient is what we would expect since we know that the population in the
North of England tends, on average, to be less healthy than people living in England’s southern
regions.
No other variables are of interest in our analysis since we assume that they are used in
the calculation of the individual’s risk premium. Hence, they are unable to give us further
information on the existence of information asymmetries in the market for health insurance.
Comparing the coefficients of both equations, we now derive conclusions about possible selection
effects due to information asymmetries.
The income variable suggests that more healthy individuals buy supplementary private health
insurance, so it should be interpreted as a source of advantageous selection in our framework.
Also financial wealth seems to drive the selection of healthier individuals into the private insur-
ance market. The impact of wealth is stronger than the income effect, which makes intuitive
sense, since we are analysing the behaviour of a population from which a minority of 33 percent
is still working. Overall, there seem to be clear indications of the existence of advantageous
selection, which is a widely found phenomenon in the literature and, in our case, also in line
with empirical evidence based on ’Chiappori and Salanie´’.
In the next step we estimate a regression of being privately insured for the people in the
’good’ health category (indicating low risk) and for the reference group (bad risk) separately8.
For some of the ‘unused characteristics’ in our model this procedure reveals very interesting
findings. Firstly the variable controlling for a high population density reveals opposite signs: a
positive relationship with insurance status for people of the good risk group, and a negative one
for the group with bad risks. Both coefficients are not statistically different in this split sample
approach. Secondly, the variable representing the highest wealth quantile is less important for
individuals within the low risk group, but stays relevant and statistically significant for both
groups. This finding suggests that, although wealth is the driving force of advantageous selection
overall, the probability of taking out insurance is even higher for the bad risks, suggesting that
7In Table 3
8In Table 4
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wealth is a source of adverse selection as well.
This suggests that a common interpretation of this variable in the ‘unused characteristics’
approach leads to a wrong conclusion being made. The variable should not just simply be
interpreted as an indication of advantageous selection any more, since the positive correlation
with insurance probability is mainly driven by individuals with poorer health.
To support this hypothesis we estimate a regression model including interaction terms of all
our explanatory variables with our low risk variable ‘good’ included in the specification. The
marginal effects shown in Table 5 provide evidence for the statistical significance of parameter
heterogeneity, ie we are testing whether the difference of the estimated coefficients is statistically
different from 0. Interestingly, in this setup, population density is an important driver of the
insurance decision of the good risks. One explanation for this finding is that the coefficients
can be interpreted with regard to the overall population used in this study. This suggests that,
people living in highly dense areas who are in good health, have an above-average probabilty
of taking out insurance. Therefore, population density can also be interpreted as a source of
advantageous selection.
As expected, the interaction term of the 4th wealth quantile was found to be negativly
related to the insurance decision, suggesting some kind of offsetting of the overall advantageous
selection effect by adverse selection. In this setup the interaction is not statistically significant
at standard levels.
In comparison with the nonlinear model, the LPM suggests9 both interaction terms to be
statistically significant. Despite theoretical concerns over the interpretation of the coefficients
in a LPM (eg Wooldridge (2003)), we interpret this finding to support our hypothesis about the
relevance of parameter heterogeneity.
Hence we conclude that, although a variable can be correlated with insurance and health
status separately, the relationship does not necessarily tell us anything about the importance of
information aysmmetries. This is because the estimated coefficients of such a variable (indicating
IA) can be caused mainly by heterogeneous parts of the population. Also, if no correlation is
found, there might still a selection mechanism driven by a variable included in the specification,
which is incorrectly not revealed when the unused-characteristics approach is applied.
This suggests that, as 2 different sources of private information can offset the correlation of
the error in the approach of Chiappori and Salanie´ (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), the inclu-
sion of private information within an ‘unused characteristics’ framework can lead to incorrect
conclusions if the estimated coefficients in both equations are driven by different parts of the
population.
Using different sources of unused information, overall we found advantageous selection to be
the most relevant selection mechanism in the supplementary private health insurance market
in England. This finding conflicts with evidence on the English market for private medical
insurance by Olivella and Vera-Hernandez (2006) who claim the existence of adverse selection.
The discrepancy might be explained by the fact that we use a different methodology and focus
on the age 50+ population as opposed to the whole population. If the latter point is important
it would be of interest to reveal why the selection mechanism differs so strikingly between the
age groups. Our findings do not purport to make any claims about welfare, ie we do not know
whether the advantageous selection is an indicator of market inefficiency due to overinsurance,
or whether marginal costs equal willingness to pay in equilibrium (Einav et al., 2010).
9Results provided in Table 6
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4 Conclusion
After introducing the institutional background of the UK health system, we provided an overview
about commonly used testing procedures for the detection of information asymmetries, focusing
on its strengths and weaknesses. We also summarized some empirical findings for the UK private
health insurance market.
We argued that, although a classical positive correlation test might lead to incorrect con-
clusions, it still has the advantage that it compares each individual in the sample with itself,
through the correlation of the residuals. To account for that advantage within the often adopted
‘unused characteristics’ approach (eg Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)) we controlled for the pos-
sibility of parameter heterogeneity to avoid possible misinterpretation. We provided separate
estimates for different groups and fully interacted specifications to show that parameter het-
erogeneity is a relevant issue if we want to measure the probability of taking out insurance for
the total population. This can be problematic within a framework using 2 equations if evidence
is wrongly based on single coefficients to derive conclusions about the existence of information
asymmetries in insurance markets.
Our findings suggest that, due to the existence of heterogeneous subpopulations, some kinds
of selection mechanisms cannot be revealed by using just two equations and calculating marginal
effects. The idea that the estimated mean from such an approach can be driven by a different
part of the population suggests even that the opposite interpretation is possible (ie claiming that
a detected source of adverse selection is in fact advantageous selection, or vice versa). Neverthe-
less, in our empirical implementation of this issue, the findings with the ‘unused characteristics’
concept are robust overall – even if we allow for heterogeneous coefficients. However, the rel-
evance of parameter heterogeneity is an empirical question and a general conclusion for other
markets cannot be provided. Hence, we suggest accounting for parameter heterogeneity when
using this approach to detect specific sources of information asymmetries.
Another interesting finding of this study is that, overall, there is a selection of good risks
into the market for private health insurance in England which is mainly driven by variation of
income and wealth.
Our findings are important for analysing the efficiency of insurance markets. It is of interest
to both the insurance industry and policy makers, and should be allowed for whenever structural
changes in contract design or institutions are implemented. Our findings are particularly relevant
in the case of unused variables for which, a priori, we cannot assume any specific relationship
with insurance status and health status. In this case, it is necessary to be very careful about
potential parameter heterogeneity.
Since we do not have any information about costs arising due to information asymmetries,
and do not assume any specific utility function, we cannot make any claim about welfare in the
market for private health insurance. Nevertheless, our findings should be taken into account in
future research since they directly affect the interpretation of which kind of selection is measured
in the observed market. Assuming that our subjective health-risk variable is a good indicator
for the individual health status, we still do not know if it is also a good measure for health
care utilization. Hence, we make the implicit assumption in our analysis that people with a
relatively low (or relatively high) self assessed health status are correlated with a higher (lower)
probability of making a claim in respect of health insurance. Future research should evaluate
if the relevance of our findings can be supported when using objective data about health care
utilization, eg number of visits to the doctor or, even better, treatment costs.
An additional feature of our study is that there is very little regulation in relation to the
market for private health insurance in the UK. Given the competitive nature of the UK mar-
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ket, the findings could be interpreted as a benchmark compared to analysis which is based on
populations with different institutional backgrounds. For future research it would be of interest
to analyze deviations with regard to market regulation. In particular, it would be interesting to
compare our findings with outcomes in more regulated markets, eg the US.
References
Ai, C., Norton, E., 2003. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters 80 (1),
123–129.
Akerlof, G., 1970. The market for” lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism.
The quarterly journal of economics, 488–500.
Bolin, K., Hedblom, D., Lindgren, A., Lindgren, B., 2010. Asymmetric information and the
demand for voluntary health insurance in europe. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Boyle, S., 2011. United kingdom (england) health system review. Health systems in transition
13 (1), 1.
Chiappori, P., Salanie´, B., 1997. Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data. Euro-
pean Economic Review 41 (3-5), 943–950.
Cohen, A., 2005. Asymmetric information and learning: evidence from the automobile insurance
market. Review of Economics and Statistics 87 (2), 197–207.
Cohen, A., Siegelman, P., 2010. Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets. Journal of
Risk and Insurance 77 (1), 39–84.
Cutler, D., Finkelstein, A., McGarry, K., 2008. Preference heterogeneity and insurance markets:
Explaining a puzzle of insurance. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dardanoni, V., Li Donni, P., 2008. Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets
with unobservable types. Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 8,
26.
Dionne, G., Gourie´roux, C., Vanasse, C., 2001. Testing for evidence of adverse selection in the
automobile insurance market: A comment. Journal of Political Economy 109 (2), 444–453.
Doiron, D., Jones, G., Savage, E., 2008. Healthy, wealthy and insured? the role of self-assessed
health in the demand for private health insurance. Health economics 17 (3), 317–334.
Dye, C., 2008. Health and urban living. Science 319 (5864), 766.
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. R., 2010. Estimating welfare in insurance markets using
variation in prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (3), 877–921.
Finkelstein, A., McGarry, K., 2006. Multiple dimensions of private information: evidence from
the long-term care insurance market. American Economic Review 96 (4), 938–958.
13
Finkelstein, A., Poterba, J., 2006. Testing for adverse selection with” unused observables”. Tech.
rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Idler, E., Benyamini, Y., 1997. Self-rated health and mortality: a review of twenty-seven com-
munity studies. Journal of health and social behavior, 21–37.
King, D., Mossialos, E., 2005. The determinants of private medical insurance prevalence in
england, 1997–2000. Health services research 40 (1), 195–212.
Mu¨ller-Nordhorn, J., Binting, S., Roll, S., Willich, S., 2008. An update on regional variation in
cardiovascular mortality within europe. European heart journal 29 (10), 1316.
Olivella, P., Vera-Hernandez, M., 2006. Testing for adverse selection into privatemedical insur-
ance.
Propper, C., Rees, H., Green, K., 2001. The demand for private medical insurance in the uk: a
cohort analysis. The Economic Journal 111 (471), 180–200.
Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J., 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on
the economics of imperfect information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 629–649.
Wallis, G., 2003. The determinants of demand for private medical insurance: evidence from the
british household panel survey.
Wooldridge, J., 2003. Introductory econometrics. A Modern Approach. 2nd edition. Thomson
South-Western.
14
Table 1: Data description
Variable Description
privins owner of private health insurance
good excellent and very good health
obese body mass index >35
alcohol daily drinker
north North, North West, Yorkshire, Humberside and Durham
middle East Midlands, West Midlands and East Anglia
south west South West
highdens 5th density quintile
inc2 second income quantile
inc3 third income quantile
inc4 fourth income quantile
wealth2 second wealth quantile
wealth3 third wealth quantile
wealth4 fourth wealth quantile
smoke smoking
women female
age6070 age 60 to 69
age7080 age 70 to 79
age8090 age 80 to 89
age90100 age 90+
work respondent is working
educ more than no qualification
famstat married or cohabit
nwhite ethnicity recoded to non white
children respondent has children
childrenHH has children in household
eye diagnosed glaucoma, diabetic eye disease, macular degeneration or cataract
angina respondent had angina
psychic Parkinson’s disease, psychiatric disorder, Alzheimer’s disease or dementia
cancer cancer
bones arthritis or osteoporosis
breath hedibonic lung disease or asthma
stroke stroke
diab diabetes
heart myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, heart murmur or arrhythmia
bloodp hypertension
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
privins 0.141 0.348 0 1
good 0.436 0.496 0 1
obese 0.076 0.264 0 1
alcohol 0.181 0.385 0 1
north 0.299 0.458 0 1
middle 0.249 0.432 0 1
southwest 0.122 0.328 0 1
highdens 0.143 0.35 0 1
inc2 0.246 0.43 0 1
inc3 0.261 0.439 0 1
inc4 0.26 0.439 0 1
wealth2 0.247 0.431 0 1
wealth3 0.27 0.444 0 1
wealth4 0.281 0.449 0 1
smoke 0.136 0.343 0 1
women 0.554 0.497 0 1
age90100 0.006 0.075 0 1
age8090 0.086 0.28 0 1
age7080 0.241 0.428 0 1
age6070 0.355 0.479 0 1
work 0.329 0.47 0 1
educ 0.663 0.473 0 1
famstat 0.71 0.454 0 1
nwhite 0.012 0.109 0 1
children 0.861 0.346 0 1
childrenHH 0.172 0.378 0 1
eye 0.218 0.413 0 1
angina 0.099 0.298 0 1
psychic 0.105 0.307 0 1
cancer 0.08 0.271 0 1
bones 0.398 0.489 0 1
breath 0.176 0.381 0 1
stroke 0.039 0.195 0 1
diab 0.078 0.268 0 1
heart 0.172 0.377 0 1
bloodp 0.427 0.495 0 1
N 5851
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Table 3: Unused Characteristics
(1) (2)
privins good
obese 0.009 -0.101***
(0.616) (0.000)
alcohol 0.010 0.049**
(0.396) (0.012)
north -0.052*** -0.022
(0.000) (0.261)
middle -0.038*** -0.027
(0.001) (0.187)
southwest -0.037*** -0.024
(0.005) (0.309)
highdens 0.007 0.001
(0.632) (0.975)
inc2 0.016 0.032
(0.358) (0.153)
inc3 0.039** 0.029
(0.030) (0.201)
inc4 0.113*** 0.071***
(0.000) (0.004)
wealth2 0.056*** 0.052**
(0.005) (0.028)
wealth3 0.087*** 0.076***
(0.000) (0.002)
wealth4 0.146*** 0.170***
(0.000) (0.000)
smoke -0.039*** -0.114***
(0.001) (0.000)
women 0.015** 0.062***
(0.025) (0.000)
age90100 0.043 -0.061
(0.553) (0.500)
age8090 -0.034* 0.034
(0.055) (0.342)
age7080 -0.031** -0.010
(0.024) (0.679)
age6070 -0.018 0.008
(0.115) (0.695)
work -0.004 0.080***
(0.711) (0.000)
educ 0.042*** 0.035**
(0.000) (0.035)
famstat 0.002 -0.068***
(0.874) (0.000)
nwhite 0.068 -0.142**
(0.190) (0.023)
children -0.009 0.067***
(0.512) (0.002)
childrenHH -0.018 -0.051**
(0.167) (0.012)
eye 0.001 -0.061***
(0.918) (0.002)
angina 0.019 -0.178***
(0.279) (0.000)
psychic -0.022* -0.148***
(0.084) (0.000)
cancer -0.002 -0.119***
(0.885) (0.000)
bones 0.018* -0.166***
(0.059) (0.000)
breath -0.004 -0.158***
(0.706) (0.000)
stroke -0.009 -0.154***
(0.731) (0.000)
diab -0.023 -0.209***
(0.140) (0.000)
heart -0.012 -0.117***
(0.285) (0.000)
bloodp 0.002 -0.121***
(0.860) (0.000)
N 5851 5851
Finite Differences Marginal Effects,
Clustered standard errors at household,
p-values in parathesis
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4: Split Sample
(1) (2)
privins—good=1 privins—good=0
obese 0.013 0.009
(0.714) (0.616)
alcohol -0.001 0.020
(0.974) (0.166)
north -0.062*** -0.043***
(0.001) (0.001)
middle -0.039** -0.038***
(0.042) (0.001)
southwest -0.050** -0.029**
(0.022) (0.041)
highdens 0.039 -0.013
(0.148) (0.400)
inc2 0.036 0.005
(0.289) (0.759)
inc3 0.068** 0.023
(0.042) (0.205)
inc4 0.167*** 0.069***
(0.000) (0.003)
wealth2 0.033 0.066***
(0.360) (0.002)
wealth3 0.092** 0.078***
(0.014) (0.001)
wealth4 0.115*** 0.174***
(0.002) (0.000)
smoke -0.051** -0.027**
(0.020) (0.028)
women 0.017 0.010
(0.164) (0.267)
age90100 0.011 0.076
(0.920) (0.413)
age8090 -0.047 -0.027
(0.160) (0.145)
age7080 -0.038 -0.022
(0.116) (0.139)
age6070 -0.027 -0.014
(0.162) (0.293)
work -0.021 0.009
(0.261) (0.534)
educ 0.041** 0.039***
(0.020) (0.000)
famstat 0.032* -0.017
(0.093) (0.233)
nwhite 0.044 0.072
(0.611) (0.224)
children -0.015 -0.006
(0.541) (0.708)
childrenHH -0.056*** 0.009
(0.003) (0.559)
eye 0.024 -0.007
(0.356) (0.575)
angina -0.047 0.034*
(0.155) (0.060)
psychic -0.049** -0.004
(0.030) (0.800)
cancer 0.026 -0.008
(0.391) (0.589)
bones 0.023 0.019*
(0.189) (0.061)
breath -0.016 -0.001
(0.432) (0.940)
stroke -0.021 -0.006
(0.731) (0.811)
diab -0.030 -0.015
(0.436) (0.313)
heart -0.031 -0.001
(0.143) (0.921)
bloodp 0.009 -0.000
(0.564) (0.959)
N 2551 3300
Finite Differences Marginal Effects,
Clustered standard errors at household,
p-values in parathesis
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Interacted Probit Model
(1)
privins
alcohol .0126
(0.292)
obese .0107
(0.552)
north -.0507***
(0.001)
middle -.0394***
(0.004)
southwest -.0370
(0.013)**
highdens .0036
(0.802)
inc2 .0159
( 0.343)
inc3 .0396
(0.034)**
inc4 .1066***
(0.000)
wealth2 .0554***
(0.006)
wealth3 .0841***
(0.000)
wealth4 .1478***
(0.000)
alcohol good -.0224
(0.327)
obese good .0010
(0.976)
north good -.0002
(0.990)
middle good .0137
(0.455)
southwest good -.0058
(0.794)
highdens good .0506*
(0.088)
inc2 good .0281
(0.410)
inc3 good .0349
(0.339)
inc4 good .0798*
(0.087)
wealth2 good -.0409
(0.301)
wealth3 good -.0004
(0.991)
wealth4 good -.0705
(0.156)
N 5851
Finite Differences Marginal Effects,
Clustered standard errors at household,
p-values in parathesis
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: Interacted LPM
(1)
privins
alcohol 0.025
(0.143)
obese 0.004
(0.826)
north -0.050***
(0.002)
middle -0.047***
(0.005)
southwest -0.040*
(0.066)
highdens -0.013
(0.419)
inc2 0.001
(0.935)
inc3 0.018
(0.288)
inc4 0.081***
(0.000)
wealth2 0.039***
(0.003)
wealth3 0.047***
(0.002)
wealth4 0.148***
(0.000)
alcohol good -0.029
(0.281)
obese good 0.009
(0.824)
north good -0.015
(0.551)
middle good 0.004
(0.874)
southwest good -0.021
(0.540)
highdens good 0.048*
(0.099)
inc2 good 0.021
(0.403)
inc3 good 0.028
(0.318)
inc4 good 0.075**
(0.026)
wealth2 good -0.025
(0.296)
wealth3 good 0.008
(0.754)
wealth4 good -0.056*
(0.081)
N 5851
Clustered standard errors at household,
p-values in parathesis
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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